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A Q&A (and Behind-The-Scenes) Guide on the Legal Reforms Regarding Artistic Censorship

Q. What shall the reform change and how?

The reform is essentially based on two documents

1.      Legal Notice entitled Criminal Code Amendment Act 2015; and
2.      Extreme Pornography Regulations 2015

The Criminal Code Amendment Act 2015 shall primarily amend the following:-

1.      Article 163 of the Criminal Code  (Vilification of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion) – REPEALED

2.      Article 164 of the Criminal Code (Vilification of other cults tolerated by law) – REPEALED

3.      Article 165 of the Criminal Code (Obstruction of religious services) – significantly amended by removing the distinction between the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith and “other religions tolerated by law” whilst considerably reducing criminal punishment to the level of a contravention (ammenda), save where the obstruction of religious functions are accompanied by violence;

4.      Article 208 of the Criminal Code (Offences relating to pornographic or obscene articles) – completely substituted by a new crime, largely modeled on the UK “Indecent Displays (Control) Act 1981”. The new article shall penalize the display of pornographic material in public places by means of a fine (contrary to UK law, imprisonment is excluded) not exceeding €1000. The display of such material, however, shall be permitted under certain circumstances or controls, namely where the display is against payment for persons over eighteen years of age and/or where the establishment gives adequate forewarning to the public by affixing a specific notice.

This article does not apply:

a.      To films and theatrical productions (because these are governed by their own specific laws and/or regulations);
b.      To displays in museums and art galleries (erotic art/sculpture, etc. exhibited in galleries and museums shall not constitute an offence under this article);
c.      To displays of the actual human body (so these reforms will not be regulating gentleman’s clubs or by any means permitting live nudity/sex shows – these will have to be regulated by other laws).

The new Article 208 shall be entitled Display of pornographic material in public places


5.      Pornography and Obscenity Regulations 1975 (Subsidiary Legislation 9.05) – REPEALED

6.      Sub-article (3) of Article 82 of the Customs Ordinance (Power to prohibit imports) – minor amendment whereby the words “pornographic or obscene character” have been deleted throughout and substituted with “extreme pornographic images”. This article currently empowers the Commissioner for Customs to prohibit and/or destroy imported material, which he suspects to be pornographic or obscene. 

Q. Will the reform be introducing new laws or regulations?

Yes, the reform is proposing to introduce two new articles in the Criminal Code and new regulations on extreme pornographic images:-

1.      Article 208D of the Criminal Code (Offences relating to extreme pornographic images)  - This law is modeled on the reforms introduced by the UK Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (Article 63 et seq thereof) and is structured on the existing article 208. It shall be a crime, punishable by a fine not less than €3000 but not exceeding €6000 or to imprisonment for a term not less than 18 months but not exceeding three years, or to both such fine or imprisonment, to produce, manufacture, distribute, trade, etc. in extreme pornographic images, so defined in specific regulations drawn up by the Minister for Justice.

The proposed law allows for certain defences to be put up by a person accused, such as that he can prove that such images were sent to him or where in his possession without his knowledge or consent; or that he did not see such images nor had he cause to suspect that material in his possession contained such images.

2.      Article 208E of the Criminal Code (Non-consensual disclosure of private sexual photographs and films) – it shall now be a crime, punishable by a fine of not less than €3000 but not exceeding €5000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years (or to both such fine and imprisonment) for a person to disclose (share with others) private sexual/intimate photographs or films of another person without that person’s consent. Such acts are colloquially referred to as revenge porn.

This crime is quite innovative in scope and substance as it seeks to prevent and condemn, perhaps for the first time in the history of Maltese legislation, the act of causing actual emotional or psychological harm caused to others. It is innovative also in the sense that such law is still the subject of debate in other European countries.

This article also provides certain defences for the accused.

3.      Extreme Pornographic Images Regulations, 2015 – These regulations seek to replace the now obsolete Pornography and Obscenity Regulations, 1975 and is mostly modelled on the Scottish equivalent of the English Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, i.e. the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010. The regulations define what is meant by “extreme pornographic image”, and particular offers a coherent and realistic definition of pornography: -


Pornographic – in essence, an image is deemed to be “pornographic” if it is of such a nature that it must reasonably be assumed to have been produced solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal. Under the present Pornography and Obscenity Regulations, pornography is primarily defined as the exploitation of, or undue emphasis on sex, crime violence, cruelty or horror (!?). Furthermore, in determining whether an image or series of images is pornographic, reference must be made to the context, narrative and sounds accompanying such image or series of images. If, when taken as a whole, that image or series of images provides a context that is not of a nature deemed to have been produced solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal that image or series of images shall not be pornographic.  In simpler terms, the prosecution may not pick on one scene, passage or word, if such scene, passage or word forms part of a larger narrative that is not primarily sexual – even if that scene, passage, or word – when taken by itself – would deemed to be, by any rational person, pornographic.

Extreme – an image is extreme if it portrays in an explicit and realistic manner acts that threaten a person’s life, grievous injury, rape, necrophilia and bestiality

Image – an image is defined as any image, whether still or moving as well as data stored electronically and which is capable of conversion into a still or moving image

The regulations do not apply to any images that form part of material, whether physical or electronic, that serve the public good on the grounds that it is in the interests of science, literature, art or learning (the public good defence).


Q. The proposed laws seem to revolve mainly around pornographic images and display of material. What about literature (words)? Will these be illegal?

Consider it this way. The law criminalizes certain images or the public display and disclosure of pornographic material (in violation of the conditions set out above). It does not, however, criminalize the written word that is normally found within the hard (or soft) covers of books and magazines. Indeed, the new article 208 excludes any material “which is not exposed to view”. Furthermore, literature generally tends to convey meanings and emotions that are not purely and solely sexual or otherwise primarily intended for sexual arousal. This would absolve the writer or publisher from disseminating pornographic material. Always remember the context: “when taken as a whole”.

Naturally, everything has to be considered according to the particular facts, and on a case-by-case basis, but whatever the case the reforms are a marked difference from the existing laws which criminalize any “obscene print, painting, photograph, film, book, card or writing, or any other pornographic or obscene article whatsoever”, arguably even the simple private possession thereof.


Q. What about the offence of obscene libel under the Press Act?

The original draft proposals sought to repeal the offence of obscene libel (Article 7 of the Press Act). The Ministry for Justice, Culture and Local Government has, however, decided not to include this under this particular reform but shall tackle it through a holistic and ambitious reform of the Press Act itself, particularly reforms to libel law. It is expected that the offence of obscene libel shall be completely repealed.


Q. What is the rationale for the reform? How does it compare to the reforms in theatre and film enacted in 2012?

The reforms proposed and ultimately enacted in 2012 went a long way in liberating theatrical performances and film (cinema) from the arbitrary clutches of the censor where a few men and/or women (perhaps just the one) decided for you what to see and not see – solely guided by what they, he or she, decided was morally acceptable. It can be said, therefore, that the purest form of censorship, or censorship a priori (before the fact, a.k.a. “prior restraint”) has been effectively abolished. Truth be told, and technically speaking, certain films may still be banned from public viewing (for example by not being classified; and therefore not fit for view) but since 2012 (when classification, rather than censorship, became the rule) this is hardly ever the case. Needless to say these reforms were an obvious and logical reaction to the infamous Stitching judgment.

Nonetheless certain laws, precisely the ones delineated above in this Q&A, could still be used – and have indeed been used – to punish artists, writers, satirists and so on for vilifying/mocking religion or for producing obscene content. To name a few examples:


  • ·        In 2010 a certain Alexander Baldacchino was was convicted under Article 208 for the exhibition of pornographic films in the City Lights Theatre (Valletta).
  • ·        A year prior, Mark Camilleri and Alex Vella Gera (the famous Li Tkisser Sewwi /Realta’ case) were accused under article 208 of the Criminal Code and article 7 of the Press Act for publishing and writing (respectively) an obscene short story. They were ultimately found not guilty but had to endure the ordeal of criminal prosecution for at least three to four years. In this case the Attorney General argued that it is the Court alone which should determine what is obscene, without reference to any expert testimony: meaning that forensic/expert evidence is not allowed in cases such as these.
  • ·        In bygone times (1960) the police had prosecuted a person for playing the song called “Nuda” by Domenico Modugno on a jukebox in a cafeteria in Sliema. Another for sharing nudist paintings with his friends (1954). They were both found guilty.

So it was felt, and strongly argued by us (Mark Camilleri and myself who worked on this reform) that on the basis of laws such as these, Maltese artists and writers rarely dared to challenge the status quo. Whilst one was technically free to write, to paint, to sing and to publish that painting, writing, or song, the artist could yet be ensnared “by the policeman’s intrusive thumb and the judge’s heavy hand” (Supreme Justice Potter Stewart, USA). With these laws, the artist risks going to jail dare he stray into the realm of "taboo", and this would lead him to censor himself: auto-censorship or censorship a posteriori (after the fact).

We sought therefore to eliminate this form of post-censorship as far as possible. In so doing, we were guided by the following key principles (listed in no hierarchical order):

1.      The recognition that concepts/understanding of morality change with time (and space) and the law ought to reflect such societal changes. The law is, after all, a living instrument;

2.      The simple idea that the State ought not to keep acting as the moral custodian (custos morum) of society. Reasonable consenting adults should be at liberty to see, read or listen to whatever they desire provided that no actual harm is caused to others. Rather the State should ensure that the public is given prior information or knowledge as to the content of certain material – the choice is then up to the viewer/reader or listener;

3.      That criminal law should ultimately be based on objective, scientific, forensic evidence and not on mere value-judgments: subjective assumptions or suppositions of what is morally acceptable or unacceptable;

4.      That criminal law should seek to punish, as far as possible, actual harm, proven beyond all reasonable doubt. Thus, protecting the sexual innocence of minors and criminalizing content that is so (extremely and realistically so) violent, repugnant, degrading, humiliating as well as the freedom of religious expression and assembly are public goods that ought to be protected – and have indeed been protected. This is why we also sought to protect persons from actual psychological harm/distress caused by “revenge porn”: acts that may lead to depression and even suicide.

5.      The notion that any limitation of rights, such as free speech, ought to be proportional to the public good sought to be protected (protection of morals and so on).

6.      That subjecting certain material to criminal trial is ultimately self-defeating. To quote Geoffrey Robertson Q.C. “‘seek to suppress a book by legal action because it tends to corrupt...the publicity attendant on its trial will spread that assumed corruption far more effectively than its quiet distribution.’”

7.      The fundamental idea laid down by the European Court of Human Rights way back in 1976, namely that freedom of expression “is applicable not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population” (Handyside vs UK).

Q. How can one justify vilifying the Roman Catholic faith, the national majority religion, but punish hatred towards minorities?

To vilify and to incite hatred or violence are very different things. Vilify is generally defined as “to say or write very harsh and critical things about (someone or something)” (Merriam-Webster), whereas incite is defined as  “to cause (someone) to act in an angry, harmful, or violent way” or “to cause (an angry, harmful, or violent action or feeling)” (Merriam-Webster).

Under article 82A of the Criminal Code it is a crime to incite hatred or violence against other persons because of their race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religious beliefs, and so on. This has not been touched by the proposed reforms.

So once again, the notion of actual harm comes into play in the distinction of being criticized or offended (on the basis of your beliefs) and actually being intimidated/threatened or otherwise put into peril/manifest jeopardy (because of your beliefs).

It is therefore posited that by ridiculing your beliefs by words or depictions, usually to express an idea or message, such as anger at the Catholic Church’s dogmatism on condom-use, homosexuality, inaction/silence on paedophilia by the clergy – or,conversely, by ridiculing the atheist’s own dogmatism on the non-existence of God, Church-bashing or (what one may perceive and believe to be) lack of values, I am not placing you, nor your belief/disbelief in any harm.

For further insight into this subject see Guardian opinion piece here


Q. Is there a difference between blasphemy and vilification of religion?

The difference, if any, is very subtle. Blasphemy is typically defined, as “something said or done that is disrespectful to God or to something holy” (Merriam-Webster). Strictly speaking, therefore, to vilify a religion is akin to being disrespectful to that religion. Perhaps a simpler distinction can be made between doing or saying something disrespectful to God or something holy and rude/uncouth utterances of God/holiness said in vain (in Maltese: dagħa).

The act of uttering obscenities and performing lewd acts in public is still punishable as a contravention under article 338(bb) of the Criminal Code. Article 342 of the Criminal Code specifies further that where those obscene utterances consist in blasphemy (dagħa) the lowest punishment is an amenda of €11.65 and the maximum is imprisonment for three months.

However, that article (338(bb)) is qualified in the Maltese text by the phrase “għad li jkun xurban”. The English text is somewhat different and states “even though in a state of intoxication…”. It is to my mind unclear, therefore, whether such contravention is qualifying whether a person is to be intoxicated or not.

This article was not touched by the reform. I confess that it may be correct to say that it was missed by the undersigned and Mark and I therefore encourage the legislator to look into it, since it could still be used against the arts. I would advocate complete repeal save for the part concerning lewd acts in public.

Q. Will these reforms permit live nudity or sex and/or sex shops?

Displays of the actual human body are not covered by the proposed reforms – to the contrary it is explicitly stated in the proposed (new) Article 208 that this article is not to be interpreted as permitting any show of live sexual activity involving the sexual organs made solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal. Gentleman’s clubs, therefore, are not strictly speaking subject to these laws and such establishments still require ad hoc regulation, which – I am informed – the Government is looking into.

Sex shops selling pornographic content or materials, on the other hand, will be permitted under the proposed reforms provided an adequate warning notice (the wording of which is specified in the law) is displayed and that nothing pornographic is publically displayed. Having said that, it stands to reason that such shops ought to be subject to special police licensing (regulating, for example, the locations where such shops may be opened). Moreover, the commercial viability of such shops is somewhat dubious when such content may be viewed, accessed or purchased in complete privacy at the click of a button. It is important to highlight that the main scope of these reforms was not the legalization of porn shops as some sections of the media regretfully highlighted. This is merely an ancillary consequence of the main objective(s) that have (hopefully) been highlighted above.

DISCLAIMER: THE ABOVE Q&A SOLELY REPRESENTS THE UNDERSIGNED’S PERSONAL INTERPRETATION, VIEWS AND OPINIONS AND NOT OF ANY PUBLIC OR GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.





Dr. Andrew Sciberras

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Criminal Defamation: Just Plain Evil or Necessary Evil?

From the outset the title of this blogpost immediately conveys the idea that I consider criminal defamatory libel "evil". In particular, I find that it is inherently wrong and undemocratic to put someone in prison for words or writings about others even if they end up to be purely speculative or outright false. Criminal libel is part of our criminal law and is established as a crime in Article 252 as follows:

252. Whosoever, with the object of destroying or damaging the reputation of any person, shall offend such person by words, gestures, or by any writing or drawing, or in any other manner, shall, on conviction, be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, or to a fine (multa). 

The penalty is decreased where the defamation consists of vague expressions or indeterminate reproaches, or where the words or gestures used are merely indecent (crime becomes a contravention). However, it is increased if such defamation occurs in writing, drawings or effigies that are divulged and exhibited to the public (imprisonment of up to one year). Moreover, the party who defames is not allowed to produce evidence of the truth except in the case of public officials and he/she shall only be exempt from punishment where that truth is deemed by the courts to be in the public interest. It appears that in the case of private individuals there is no defence. 

The criminal law, however, makes a distinction between defamation and libel on printed matter. In the latter case, it states that the provisions of the Press Act shall apply. 

The issue with defamation is a delicate one. Unfortunately for free-speech radicals, damage by words or writing to the reputation of others is one of the exceptions to freedom of expression. One must bear in mind that the motivation behind such law is that a person who, in bad faith and with malicious intent, conjurs up a falsity to utterly destroy the reputation and honour of another (his family included) should be made to suffer some form of punishment. I think that most would agree that this is a serious inherent wrong that is objectively justified. The problem arises with respect to punishment: is imprisonment a proportionate response to counter such wrong? 

Furthermore (and parallels can be drawn here with the laws on obscenity and their consequences viz-a-viz artists) such a punishment may indeed serve to stifle the media. But one must not immediately come to the conclusion that, as a result, laws such as these should be immediately demolished and thrown in the dustbin of history. That would be rash and may open up a Pandora's box - or simply a case of going from one extreme to the other.  

The UK abolished criminal defamatory libel as recently as 2010, but as other more recent events suggest (Leveson comes to mind), the media too can play very dirty games. Of course, one has to take into account the fact that the case with NotW/Murdoch/etc involved other offences relating to privacy -  but these same issues (recordings and whatnot) are cropping up here too. 

Whatever the case, I claim that the motivation behind this law is well-reasoned but it does require serious reform. Perhaps one step forward would be to give the alleged "defamor" more freedom to prove the veracity of his allegations - in other words this defence should not be restricted in any way. Secondly, the law or procedure should be drafted in such a way that the prosecution and/or complainant must prove beyond any reasonable doubt whatsoever three key points: (1) the falsity of the words, writing or gestures (the mind boggles at what such gestures could be) ; (2) bad faith; (3) malicious intent. Thus, even though a writing may found to be ultimately false, the "defamor" should be exonerated when he/she proves that such writing was drafted in good faith and/or without malicious intent. A case that comes to mind is that issue concerning Joseph Mizzi's (public official) alleged "drunk" episode at the Eurovision. Mizzi may have furnished proof that his drink was in fact spiked, but it does not mean that the press who brought this incident to light did so in bad faith. Other obvious cases are articles on statements on serious shortcomings - even corruption (and associated whiffs) - but which cannot be definitively proven. 

Thirdly, the punishment for imprisonment should be removed as I feel that, although the damage caused may be serious, it would be a disproportionate response to mitigate such a crime - all the more so when it is applied to journalists who draw up articles from various sources. Furthermore, it appears that such punishment is a mere relic of the past as it is supposedly no longer applied/enforced by the courts.

Another plausible alternative would be to merely remove the criminal aspect and to retain the civil "offence" under tort/libel. A legitimate downside to this (in my opinion) is that in the civil realm, the court bases its decisions on what is called 'balance of probabilities' rather than 'proof beyond reasonable doubt'. Thus it may be easier for a civil court to conclude that harm was done than a criminal court; and there is more scope for subjectivity rather than objective forensic evidence.  

Ultimately, the monetary compensation and the exoneration by the court of the alleged crime should definitely serve as sufficient remedy. Coupled with this should be other procedural reforms in the sense that such cases are treated with greater urgency by the courts. This is best for both parties for on the one hand the alleged victim may lose not only his reputation but also livelihood (by being forced to resign for example), and on the other hand (if the criminal offence is retained) the alleged violator would be accused of a crime which is serious in itself. Another interesting aspect (more substantive than procedural), but which may not go down well, would be to apply fines that are proportionate to the damage suffered - both actual and moral - and not a mere maximum of €x. Lastly, and perhaps this is the most difficult part albeit the most obvious, persons in the public sphere have to acknowledge that they are not immune from scrutiny - that the functions they serve (and not their private lives, please) and how they serve them must be put under the magnifying glass. 

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Judicial Reform

We've probably heard it all before in 2001; that the judiciary is in need of a complete overhaul. Nothing much has really changed though, if at all. During that time I was but 14-15 years old, probably studying O-Level Chemistry and Biology, growing my hair, headbanging to Opeth and Beheaded and not giving too many shits about current affairs. In that rebellious spirit I was adamant to steer away from law, aiming for Medicine & Surgery instead, because it was bloody intriguing (pun intended). Horns up and all that. 

But times changed and the "family footsteps" I have indeed followed. Just one tiny step away from being a fully-fledged lawyer interested in litigation, the very foundations of the justice system have been rocked once again (can't wait to see next year's B.Comm or Architecture & Engineering buscade banners) and this time it stings

So here's my two-cents about judicial reform. 

A Universal and Objective Truth 


First and foremost, no system will ever guarantee foolproof protection against corruption and bribery. The vice of corruption in inseparable from big fat human mistakes which not only destroy one's career but - far worse - one's integrity, reputation and honour. Having said that, there may be ways that can offer a greater guarantee of appointing more suitable members to the bench. Or at least, certain manners of appointment may offer a greater degree of public trust in such a vital institution. 

The Current System 


The current system, enshrined as it is in our Constitution, provides that both Judges and Magistrates are appointed by the President in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. In other, words, Judges and Magistrates are appointed by the Prime Minister of the day. In other other words, Judges and Magistrates are either appointed by a Nationalist or Labour administration. These are, pretty much, political appointments limited only by certain factors, such as that Judges may only be appointed after he or she has practised law  as an advocate in Malta for an aggregate of twelve years (seven for Magistrates). Nonetheless, the allegation/insinuation/perception (call it what you will) that Judges and Magistrates are either blue or red-eyed is not that wide off the mark in the whole scheme of things, even if they have to exercise their functions and conduct themselves (both judicial and personal - ideally) in a manner free from all political bias or connections whatsoever. For the maxim that justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done, the current system does not offer such a solid guarantee. Furthermore, the current system offers no guarantee of appointing members to the bench that are truly well versed in the law, its interpretation and it's application to the facts of a case, resting as it does on a largely subjective decision of the Prime Minister and, presumably, his Cabinet. 

Democratisation of the Judiciary?


What if we were to adopt a system whereby members of the judiciary are democratically elected by a free and sovereign people? This would surely take the decision out of the politicians' hands and offer the greatest degree of public trust possible. I mean if a majority of people directly elect members of the judiciary then they must surely have trust in him or her. All pretence of subjective and political appointments would wither away. But the pitfalls of this system, promising though it may sound, are larger than its positive aspects - at least in my opinion. First of all, the judge would him or herself become somewhat of a "politician" susceptible to lobbying by major interest groups. We would have the Judge or Magistrate of the Chamber of Commerce or the Hunting and Trapping Federation to whom he or she would owe a certain fealty. The more wealthier lawyers, with the greater connections would surely have a greater advantage - even if he or she is a nincompoop when it comes to the law. This could be tempered by disallowing all forms of advertising, lobbying, endorsements and donations in the case of judicial elections - but that, in turn, could give rise to free speech issues. Secondly, holding nation-wide elections in a system where judges and magistrates are appointed "for life" (or rather until they attain the age of 65 years) would surely give cause to logistical and financial headaches. Whilst this is no reason to hinder democracy, it is, nonetheless, a real problem.

The Academic Judge


Another system, followed in certain nations of the Continent, such as Italy, Germany and Spain, is based on actually studying and obtaining a degree/doctorate (whatever) to become a judge or magistrate. This would require the creation of a specific "Judiciary Course" whereby holders of a law degree or doctorate would further their studies to become judges or magistrates in a competitive academic system. Here again, and if the selection process is truly fair and based on merit, the decision is taken out of politicians' hands. This is an interesting way in which to solve current shortcomings, for in one fell swoop it would decapitate political subjectivity and guarantee that the persons sitting on the bench are more specialised in legal interpretation and application. The problem here, however, is that if one where to immediately further his studies to become a judge or magistrate then he or she would be deprived of any *real* court practice. He or she would be more of an academic rather than a lawyer - not that there is anything really wrong in that , but as any budding lawyer will tell you - there is a veritable yet metaphorical ocean separating life at university/academic theory and the real nitty gritty of court practice. It is much like getting out of the frying pan and into the fire - at least until you manage to settle in. This anomaly could be tempered by keeping the twelve (or seven) years court practice requirement before being eligible to enrol for such a course; plus ensuring that any such judiciary course requires mandatory practice as judicial assistant or associate judge for at least one, if not two, years. Another issue would be that such a course would have to be very restrictive and, ultimately, competitive - opening only when a vacancy is imminent - and from which only the very best may pass. Major problems would arise if no one is interested in the job, or if only one candidate would apply. Nonetheles competition, even if nasty, is healthy. This is a system which one should keep in mind. 

The Representative Judge


Another way round to reforming the judiciary is one which I have previously advocated here. Whilst it still leaves the decision of appointment in the hands of politicians, it is taken away from the Executive and vested in the Legislature. In other words, members of the judiciary may only be appointed in the same manner by which they are impeached; that is by a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives. Such a system would ensure a broad-spectrum of support and approval by all parties in the House and is surely a form of semi-democritisation of the current system. The vote could be preceded by a specific Parliamentary Committee, chaired by the least partisan person possible (maybe the Speaker or the President of the Republic himself) which nominates candidates in conjunction with the advice of the Commission for the Administration of Justice, the Chamber of Advocates and, why not, the Faculty of Laws (comprising the Dean and Heads of Departments). Politics would not be completely avoided and headaches/delays may arise if major disagreements exist - but it is a leap forward from what we currently have. 

Thorough Reform


Reform, however, cannot start and end with the manner in which we appoint members of judiciary. It has to be thorough and from the bottom up. Furthermore, judicial reform must be accompanied with major political reforms. Since Franco Debono said so much about this and, love him or hate him, he is right - I will spare you further reading.


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Tackling Malta's racism: Scope for legal intervention?

There is no doubt in my mind that a pernicious racism problem exists in Malta. It is not my intention to enter into a profound or detailed study into the causes of racism and xenophobia so this post will rest on this assumption. The facts, though, seem to stand out; ranging from racist killings (to give the benefit of the doubt, let me qualify them as 'alleged') to blatant discrimination, intolerant discourse and bigotry in the workplace, the street, the press, and even in the highest institutions of the state. 

Anti-discrimination laws have a basis in fundamental human rights. Consider the following articles: 

'All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status' [Article 26, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] 
'All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.' [Aritlce 7, Universal Declaration of Human Rights] 
'The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.' [Protocol Twelve, Article 1, European Convention on Human Rights]
Our very own Constitution states that:
'Subject to the provisions of sub-articles (6), (7) and (8) of this article, no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting by virtue of any written law or in the performance of the functions of any public office or any public authority.
In this article, the expression "discriminatory" means affording different treatment to different persons attributable wholly or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex whereby persons of one such description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another such description are not made subject or are accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to persons of another such description.' [Article 45, Constitution of Malta]
Yet, as far as I am aware, these laws largely relate to the so-called 'vertical relationship' between the state and its treatment of individuals as opposed to a 'horizontal relationship' between two private individuals. Nonetheless, the state has (or should have) a positive obligation to disallow discrimination even in the private sphere. Otherwise the state would be passively tolerating racism and discrimination. Should the law in this regard be strengthened? Article 82A of the Criminal Code already establishes the offence of 'incitement to racial hatred', whilst other laws (e.g. employment law) makes provisions against discrimination, but is this enough? Should we consider the promulgation of one consolidated and far-reaching 'Law Against Racism' or 'Anti-Racism Act'? (This could be more comprehensive so as to include provisions against all forms of discrimination - not racism or racial discrimination alone). 


Evo Morales's Ley Contra el Racismo y Toda Forma de Discriminación [2010] makes for interesting reading. Article 14, which concerns 'private institutions', states [loose translation]:

All private institutions must adopt or amend their by-laws so as to include offences involving racist  and/or discriminatory behaviour, such as: 
a) Racially and/or discriminatory motivated verbal aggression; 
b) Denial of access to a service for racist and/or discriminatory reasons; 
c) Physical, psychological, sexual, racist and discriminatory abuse, not constituting a crime; and 
d) Demeaning actions 
However, the European Union's 'Racial Equality' Directive [Council Directive 2000/43/EC] already makes reference to non-discrimination regarding access to services (even in the private sphere) in Article 3 (h) thereof, but I am not entirely sure whether this extends also to, say, access to a nightclub.  Nonetheless, it is questionable whether such measures are being effected in practical day to day life. Our laws concerning racial equality are found in various provisions of various different Acts and laws but they are mostly concerned with the prohibition of blatant racial hatred/discrimination (see for instance, Subsidiary Legislation 350.26 concerning 'Requirements as to Standards and Practice on the Promotion of Racial Equality'). The question I am posing is: do these laws go far enough to tackle the actual problem?


However, a very valid argument exists that no matter how many laws you may wish to introduce the problem will not be solved for it is deeply rooted in the collective psyche or culture so to speak. Racism, like political tribalism, starts at home and is fostered in places like schools and work. Being in a group of friends who advocate xenophobic opinions would also put pressure on a person not to speak out (if not to actually agree with such opinions). 


In light of these facts ambitious political, cultural and educational reforms are needed. Reform has to start with politicians and political institutions. For too long have we heard and seen politicians attempt to curry favour and popularity by exploiting voters' fears of immigration. This is a practice that has to stop although it does not mean that politicians should remain silent on issues such as responsibility sharing among EU Member States; especially in light of Malta's very limited resources. Such discourse is not racist, in so far as it is based on  objective and reasonable demands for EU aid (as opposed to discourse like 'invasion', 'disease and pestilence', 'country X should serve as the rubbish bin for Africans', etc like we are accustomed to hearing).


Secondly the state has to ensure stricter vigilance and discipline on the police corps.  Various persons have stated that the police either remain indifferent to racially motivated crimes or actually participate in them. Should the powers of the National Commission for the Promotion of Equality (NCPE) (is this body actually functioning (?) because I haven't heard anything about it in the press) be strengthened in this respect so as to be able to conduct independent inquiries into the conduct of the police force upon complaints of alleged racial abuse or omitting of their duties? 


Thirdly various educational campaigns are needed aimed at promoting racial equality and harmony. The state would spend its money better on campaigns like these rather than on useless (and non-transparent) consultancies and the like. The national curriculum of education should also include concrete measures aimed at promoting racial equality amongst students. 


There is so much that could be done. All it takes is a little bit of will-power. 

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A landmark judgment on freedom of expression and artistic freedom

I do not intend to romanticise or exaggerate the issue but it is my humble opinion that today's Realta judgment represents a significant turning point in Maltese obscenity and morality law; freedom of expression and artistic freedom. If anything, it is the first judgment of it's kind, in Malta, that deals specifically with the nebulous concepts of obscenity and pornography in literature as well as the defence of artistic merit and public good (as found in the Pornography and Obscenity Regulations 1975 - L.N. 80 of 1975). 

The fact of the matter is that our courts, especially the appellate courts, always had a tendency to adopt purely moralist or ethical interpretations of obscenity that are loaded with subjectivity and cut off from contemporary reality. In effect, they served the function of guarantors of the 'nanny state'. Thus we find in judgements such as Il-Pulizija v Domenico Catalogna et (Court of Criminal Appeal, Inferior - 1954), a case that dealt with the public exhibition of a nude painting, that '[c]hi si scusa col dire che egli dipinge il vizio e la dissoluzione, cosi come la trova nella natura e nella societa, dimentica che, per gravi ragioni, la societa esige che di alcune cose non si faccia ostentazione...Perche dovrebbe l'arte alzare quei veli? Quale ragione avrebbe per sottrarsi alle regole comuni?' (quotuing from Cocurullo, L'Oltraggio al Pubblico Pudore mediante Scritti, Disegni ed Oggetti, 1910). Coupled with this one finds various judgments declaring concubinage (cohabitation) as an offence to public morals such as Elsie Demanuele vs Richard Faulkner (First Hall Civil Court - 1988) where the Court said that 'Il-Qorti ma tistax taghti decizjoni li thalli sitwazzjoni ta' konkubinat, ghax din mhux biss tmur kontra l-morali pubblika imma wkoll kontra l-ligi'. The reason I cite these judgments is because they are the very same that the Attorney General used, in his appeal application in Realta, to show that the Court should make pure subjective analyses of obscenity and morals without any recourse to current realities. The prosecution, according to the AG, does not need to show 'the why'; 'the how'; and 'the manner' by which morals are offended. The AG also argued that literature can be deemed obscene even from mere 'purple passages' cited in isolation without any recourse to the dominant character of a story or novel taken as a whole (this is what he tried to do in open Court by reading the 'dirtiest' passages from Li Tkisser Sewwi) nor does he believe that obscene publications should be judged with regard to the likely readers, even if these are mature adults. He also contended that the Court should neither be guided by constitutional principles on free speech, nor should it have any regard to expert witnesses on the matter. 


Until today (and perhaps next week - since we still await the appeal judgment from the Constitutional Court on the Stitching case) little importance was given to certain (limited) court declarations that the concept of morals vary in space and time (certain judgments given by Judge J R Micallef, the names of which I do not know off-handedly, come to mind). The AG tried to give the impression that that which was immoral in 1950 must necessarily remain so in 2012. This is unlike the erudite doctrine of the Italian Court of Cassation which held that '...il giudice non deve essere un fustigatore dei costume, un promotore di campagne moralistiche, come la Corte di cassazione ha più volte affermato. Non è questo il compito assegnatogli dalla legge. Come già ricordato, il fondamentale parametro di riferimento per il giudice è il sentimento medio del popolo nel momento storico dato. (Cass., Pen., Sez III 30-10-1996, n. 9685). 


This has changed with the Realta appeal. In essence, the Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed the deliberations of the Court of Magistrates which held that a publication can only be deemed obscene and pornographic if it effectively 'corrupts and depraves' the reader (the English standard of obscenity) by inciting in him or her libidinous thoughts and sexual excitement. This is important for it destroys the concept of 'inherent obscenity': material must have a strong (extraneous) corruptive effect on the mind of the reader for it to be deemed obscene. It held that this effect must be proven, beyond reasonable doubt, by the Prosecution, in cases like these. It also took cognisance of defence counsel's contentions that the story Li Tkisser Sewwi in no way attempted to incite libidinous thoughts or corrupt the minds of ordinary readers; to the contrary the primary motive was to invoke a certain disgust - or anger - at the protagonist, who viewed women as sexual objects and nothing else (an unfortunate reality in the psyche of a fair number of Maltese men and indeed, the male species in general). A narration of such a reality, it said, although shocking, discomforting and not aesthetically pleasing, is neither obscene nor devoid of artistic merit. It agreed with defence counsel's claims that '...l-ghan tal-letteratura m'huwiex biss li titfa dawl fuq dak li huwa sabih fl-umanita' izda huwa anki li tiddipingi u titkellem dwar l-elementi koroh u deplorevoli ta' l-istess socjeta`'. It also made the fundamentally important declaration that '...il-moralita` pubblika hija xi haga li tinbidel biz-zmien u dak li kien joffendi l-morali pubblika ghoxrin jew tletin sena ilu mhux neccessarjament joffendi l-morali pubblika llum u dan minhabba rejaltajiet tal-hajja differenti principalment ir-rejaltajiet li ghalihom giet esposta is-socjeta Maltija permezz tal-mezzi vasti ta' komunikazzjoni moderni.' 

It is for such reasons that the Realta case, now confirmed in appeal, is a landmark judgment for it is a judicial affirmation that (1) art should not be regulated by a paternalist state that decides for adults what they should see, read and hear (in the sense that art must be aesthetically pleasing and inoffensive for it not to interfere); (2) that the artist has every right to shock, offend and challenge current contemporary reflections in society as avante-garde (a fundamental concept in free speech law); and (3) that the concept of morality is not a dogma (static and unchanging in space and time) but must be viewed in accordance with current standards of toleration in society without being detached from emerging realities of the 21st Century. 

Despite the importance of this judgment, this issue should never have gone to Court. In my opinion the main culprit was not the AG (he was, after all, doing his job albeit in a very close-minded manner) but the Rector, Juanito Camilleri. One must recall that it was on his insistence that Mark Camilleri (and, consequently, Alex Vella Gera) be taken to Court. He based his reasoning primarily on two grounds: (1) one that he was not sure what he should do in cases like these and thus wanted guidance from the Court; and (2) because the short story was placed in a journal or newspaper, the reader could easily take it to be a factual account of the author's opinion on such matters (hence the insistence, by the prosecution, on the word 'artiklu' rather than 'storja') rather than a fictitious piece of literature. Since when is the Court a means to solicit legal advice (uffiċju tal-pariri) and since when can university students not distinguish between fact of fiction? Is this the level of intellect that the Rector perceives in students? And who on earth has ever heard of university officials and academics subjecting their own students to a criminal trial for the publication of literature which offends them? This absurdity reached epic proportions and I also call for the Rector's immediate resignation now that he has gotten his answer very clearly. One must also recall how the SDM-led KSU of 2009-2010 was four-square  behind the Rector's actions, despite any declarations to the contrary, for reasons or motives upon which I shall not speculate. I can personally bear witness to this. Kemm għadkhom lura, jaħasra. Ma rrnexilkhomx. 



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Lessons of democracy from Brazil


Brazil's "popular action" allows any citizen to take a legitimate part in a proposed appeal against any (administrative) act prejudicial to public interests, or that of an agency in which the State is a partner; or to administrative morality; the environment; and the historical and cultural heritage. The author of the act--unless shown to have acted in bad faith--is exempted from the payment of judicial costs.


Malta has a similar provision in Article 116 of the Constitution although it certainly does not go as far as the Brazilian provision for it only gives individuals the right to make an action against the State for passing invalid, unconstitutional laws. It certainly does not mention 'administrative morality, the environment and historical and cultural heritage'. The Maltese 'popular action' also states that individuals do not need to show any personal/judicial interest to bring such an action. However our Courts have stubbornly dismissed many cases on the grounds that the claimants showed no personal interest in the matter and this despite the wording of the law.



The popular action is a great democratic tool for it empowers citizens themselves to 'check and balance' State institutions when they fall astray. In Malta it is all the more necessary in times of severe maladministration especially with regards to the environment and development.



Before reforming MEPA perhaps we should take a lesson from Brazil whose level of democratic participation and administrative accountability seems to surpass that of Malta.

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Two shortcomings of the justice system

The Maltese justice system can boast of a long and proud history but is not without problems. Of immediate concern are two shortcomings which I am about to relate.


The first concerns constitutionality of certain laws and procedures. Certain laws and legal/administrative procedures have been deemed to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Malta yet such laws and procedures still persist. Take for example Article 4 of the Ninth Schedule of the Value Added Tax Act (Chapter 406) which states that "An appeal against an assessment shall not be valid unless...an amount of five percent of the tax which is in dispute in terms of that appeal or one hundred euro, whichever is the higher, has been paid..." This means that a person who cannot afford such payment will in theory be denied a right of appeal. In several judgments the Constitutional Court has deemed such an imposition to be contrary to Article 39 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the European Convention as it denies one's right to a fair hearing. I think the percentage used to be higher before recent amendments but nonetheless the imposition is, in theory, still unconstitutional. Moreover, we are not talking about lawyer and court fees here but a condition for appeal.


The second concerns the efficiency of justice. We are still faced with a situation of never-ending cases-loads and law suits which take several years (at times well over a decade) until judgment is given. Thus, the entire concept of 'reasonable time' imposed by Article 6 of the European Convention is thrown out the window and seems to have no application in Malta. The wording of the law may be deceptive in that it gives one the right "to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time" but it is an established principle of natural justice that judgment should also be delivered in a reasonable time.


In my opinion both shortcomings amount to a serious breach of the fundamental human right to a fair hearing and they need to be addressed with more urgency.


I wonder, does a task force or parliamentary committee which assesses and reviews legislation which has been deemed to be unconstitutional by the Courts exist? If not, it's about time one is set up and equipped with the necessary means and resources to do a thorough job.


We also need to take concrete action and adopt a uniform and harmonious position on what constitutes 'reasonable time' and consequentially adopt a more rigid enforcement of such time.

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Setting the record straight on the Constitution

I remember it like it was yesterday. During my first lectures in constitutional law I was constantly brain-washed with the following mantra:

The Constitution of a state is the basic system of laws, customs and conventions which define (build) the composition and powers of organs of the state, and regulate the relations of the various state organs to one another and to the private citizen
 Yes, the Constitution is also that legal document in which the most basic fundamental human rights and freedoms are made law. The Constitution is not, however, a mere complaint report in which to file a grievance which may or may not happen in the future. Neither is it a green card in which fundamentalists can legalize their moralistic obsessions at will. This is what a certain radical group of anti-abortionists are setting out to do in a bid to ban abortion permanently through the Constitution. That abortion is a criminal offence, punishable by up to three years imprisonment is not enough.

Abortion is for the greater part, a moral issue. You either believe that the embryo is a human being biologically, morally and legally or that it is simply a mass of cells. But this issue has got nothing to do with being pro-life or pro-choice. That is but an an unending philosophical debate. The issue here is that it would set a dangerous precedent to impose one's purely personal moral beliefs into the Constitution and forever bind future generations due to the Constitution's rigidity. On the other side of the coin, it is equally idiotic, in my opinion to give women the right to terminate their pregnancy through the Constitution. The Constitution is not the place for this.


But isn't this an illogical statement given the fact that most fundamental rights, such as the right to life and the right to a fair trial can be called moral issues? I think not. I believe that certain rights are inherently, logically and objectively necessary in order to sustain a democracy. The right to life, i.e. the right of living persons to literally continue living without interference by the State unless by Court sentence (although capital punishment is outlawed in Malta) is absolutely necessary for democracy. I do not see how banning abortions is absolutely necessary for democracy to function. And that is what the Constitution really is. It is a legal framework which sets up the most basic political status of the state, its organs, their functions and how they relate to one another and the private citizen.

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May the Force be...diluted


The recent allegations of excessive police aggression against an African immigrant and a Dutch convict do not augur well for our country's democracy and respect for fundamental human rights. The police force is rightfully endowed with legal power to uphold law and order and to deter crime. However, they are not afforded the power to punish those that break the law through brute force. Unfortunately, these allegations - which seem to be well founded - may give rise to the fact that there is a grave abuse of power in our police force. Also shocking is another revelation by Fr. Mark Montebello who sincerely believes that an innocent immigrant is being kept in jail for a crime that he possibly could not commit for biological reasons.

  • The police force may enjoy the benefits of a union that represent their interests in working conditions and rights to afford better conditions to the police force. Better conditions can only give rise to less frustration and perhaps a slight mitigation to these problems. Check out this particular police union based in Queensland Australia as an example: Queensland Police Union of Employees
  • I believe that a solid shakeup of our police force is needed; a parliamentary committee should be appointed to analyze the issues through tabled discussions, seeking domestic and foreign expertise on the matter and implementing harsher rules aimed at deterring police brutality.
  • This committee should also draft other legislation aimed at improving the judicial system and the workings of the police force. For instance, I think it is a great shame that suspects are not afforded the right to an attorney during police interrogations. Such interrogations should also be taped and filmed in the interest of transparency because the police should have nothing to hide during interrogations.
  • The legislators should consider the shift to a civil law or inquistorial system where the Magistrate is afforded with more power to administer and enforce the law. Instead of being summoned/authorised by the Attorney General to start criminal investigations, a magistrate should enjoy his own investigatory power. The reason for this shift is obvious in that it makes the State more accountable to the public at large.
  • Another interesting suggestion is that judges should no longer be appointed by the State after having served for a minimum of 12 years as an advocate - rather they should undertake special further courses after obtaining their law doctorate. This makes it a career choice and not a political appointment - in this way, judges are better trained and more importantly do not have any political ties and favors with the State that appointed them.




These flaws in our judicial system may give rise to the fact that racial equality is being given a blind eye by the State and that noble articles of Law on our Constitution that should safeguard fundamental human rights are merely fancy words to keep everybody smiling.


The police force may not have it all and understandably poor working conditions may give rise to flared tempers. But still, this is no justification for any excessive force and brutality. Faced with these grave problems, one must seek solutions. One should not bury his head in the sand and acknowledge this as a world-wide problem with no effective solution. Even more perturbing are those who actively seek to justify brute force in the so-called "interests of our great nation." Perhaps, our parliamentarians should consider the following:
This issues should not be taken for granted and should be included with other initiatives for strengthening democracy such as the FoI Act and party financing.

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WANTED: Transperancy! Two Acts that will Save the Country


Didn't you ever dream about knowing all the cunning and mischievous doings of your government or your employer? Didn't you ever dream about publicly telling them off and exposing their nasty little deeds without fear and hesitation? Without losing your job and your social integrity? My friends, this is possible with the immediate enactment of the Freedom of Information Act and the Whistleblower Protection Act.


What is a Freedom of Information Act?


Freedom of Information legislation are laws that define a legal process by which government information is required to be available to the public. In some countries this freedom to access information is a Constitutional guarantee but it requires other law to support it. The very first article of the UK's Freedom of Information Act 2000 states:
(1) Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled—
(a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and
(b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.
The U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is a law ensuring public access to U.S. government records. FOIA carries a presumption of disclosure; the burden is on the government - not the public - to substantiate why information may not be released. Upon written request, agencies of the United States government are required to disclose those records, unless they can be lawfully withheld from disclosure under one of nine specific exemptions in the FOIA. This right of access is ultimately enforceable in federal court.

Enacted in 1966, The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is a federal law that establishes the public's right to obtain information from federal government agencies. The FOIA is codified at 5 U.S.C. Section 552. "Any person" can file a FOIA request, including U.S. citizens, foreign nationals, organizations, associations, and universities. In 1974, after the Watergate scandal, the Act was amended to force greater agency compliance. It was also amended in 1996 to allow for greater access to electronic information.

FACT: Albania, Armenia, Belize, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Georgia, Pakistan Trinidad & Tobago and last but not least...Zimbabwe ALL have a Freedom of Information Act! Malta does not.
What is a Whistleblower?


The whistleblower typically is an employee or former employee or a member of an organization such as a government agency who reports misconduct to the appropriate entities that have the power to take corrective action. Generally such misconduct is a violation of the law or a threat to the public interest such as fraud, health and saftey violations and corruption. With a Whistleblower Protection Act, such persons that expose misconduct are guaranteed protection from victimization and dismissal. The whistleblower DOES NOT have to be involved in the misconduct.
FACT: Paul van Buitenen was a Dutch whistleblower that led to the collapse of Jacques Santer's Commission (European Commission) after he revealed to a Member of the European Parliament the irregularities, fraud and mismanagement within the Commission in 1998
. These two acts are sorely needed in this country if we are in want to boast of having a transperant public administration. Without the necessary legislation and protection the alert public cannot scrutinize the administration's misconduct and this will remain unhindered. Fraud and Corruption will be the order of the day without our knowing or without it being punished. We don't want to keep a watchful eye on the government simply for making its life harder but to ensure that the public interest, our interest, is given the greatest protection.



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